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Understanding Kho Chứng Khoán, Đánh Kho, and Vay Kho in Vietnam’s Brokerage Context

Definitions of Kho Chứng Khoán, Đánh Kho, and Vay Kho

Kho Chứng Khoán (Stock “Warehouse”): In Vietnam’s market slang, “kho chứng khoán” refers to an unofficial stock warehouse service – essentially a shadow margin lending and stock lending facility. It allows investors to obtain leverage beyond the limits of regulated margin trading, or to borrow stocks for short-selling, through a separate pool of funds or shares. In effect, it is an off-book margin loan arrangement provided not by the brokerage itself (which is legally capped at 50% loan-to-value margin) but by a third-party or informal entity​

dnse.com.vn​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. As one educational source explains, kho chứng khoán is basically the same as margin trading “but not restricted by the list of marginable stocks or the loan ratio”, typically operated by a party not licensed as a financial service provider​

dnse.com.vn. Because of this, interest rates are much higher and terms more flexible than standard margin. This service has emerged to meet investor demand for higher leverage and to margin stocks that are otherwise ineligible under official rules​

dnse.com.vn​

dnse.com.vn.

Vay Kho (Borrowing from the Warehouse): “Vay kho” means borrowing through a kho chứng khoán arrangement – i.e. taking a margin loan or stock loan from the warehouse. In practice, an investor vay kho to get cash to buy more stocks (on top of what they could with regular margin) or to borrow shares to sell short. For example, an investor with only 20% capital can borrow the remaining 80% from a kho (a 20:80 or 2:8 ratio) to purchase stocks, far above the 50% cap normally allowed​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Similarly, one can borrow shares from the kho to execute a short sale (selling now and later buying back to return the shares)​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. These are private civil agreements between the investor and the kho provider rather than official brokerage transactions​

dnse.com.vn. This is why vay kho is also sometimes called “margin cá mập” (shark margin) in street language – offers have been seen like “deposit ₫100 million to buy ₫1 billion of stock, ₫1 billion to buy ₫10 billion…” illustrating 10:1 leverage via a kho​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.

Đánh Kho (Trading via Warehouse): “Đánh kho” refers to trading stocks using a kho chứng khoán account, meaning the investor is actually trading through the warehouse’s pool or account instead of their own brokerage account. In other words, the kho provider often requires the investor’s activity to occur in an account controlled by the kho. A Vietnamese financial journal notes the key difference: with đánh kho, “the money is in someone else’s account,” whereas with a normal margin or a bank-arranged loan, the funds remain in the investor’s own account​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​

dnse.com.vn. Because the kho operator is the legal owner of the account and assets, the investor merely puts up a deposit (collateral) and the operator executes trades on their behalf at the agreed leverage. This setup circumvents the brokerage’s systems for margin limits, but it means the investor relinquishes direct control over the assets during the arrangement​

dnse.com.vn. In common usage, đánh kho simply means playing the market with warehouse leverage. It has existed in Vietnam’s market for years among veteran speculators, though historically it was offered mainly to VIP clients; only recently has it become more commonly accessible to retail players​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.

How Securities Firms Utilize Kho Chứng Khoán Services

Vietnamese securities companies have leveraged the kho chứng khoán concept to satisfy client demand for greater margin and to boost their business – essentially by outsourcing or off-balancing margin loans and stock lending. Formally, brokers are constrained by the State Securities Commission’s rules (50% max margin lending, and only on approved stocks). However, many firms found ways to “break the fence” (xé rào) of these regulations by partnering with or creating warehouses that operate parallel to their official margin systems​

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tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. There are a few common models for this:

  • Bank-Funded Margin Warehouses: Large brokers that are part of banking groups or have strong financing partners tap those affiliates to extend margin. For example, a brokerage backed by a bank might use bank funds as a “kho margin” to lend more money to clients​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. This is akin to a formal tripartite loan (vay ba bên) where the bank provides the loan, secured by the client’s stocks, allowing the client to trade in their own account with higher leverage. According to one market analyst, “for securities firms with a bank behind them, they use the bank’s capital as a margin warehouse to lend; those without a bank behind use the company’s own warehouse”​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Even so, if the bank’s risk tolerance is lower, some brokers will still resort to outside funds to satisfy risk-hungry clients​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.
  • In-House “Invisible” Warehouses: Some brokerages without easy bank credit (or even those with it) form their own off-book funding pools. Internally this might be done via proprietary trading accounts or friendly investors’ capital that act as a lending pool. Notably, a senior expert at Yuanta Vietnam described kho ngoài (outside warehouses) essentially as the brokerage advancing money upfront to the investor, similar to how banks provide loans​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. In practice, such arrangements often happen “right inside the securities company without the insiders even knowing”, run quietly by a few executives or the brokerage’s proprietary desk​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. These setups are geared toward aggressive short-term traders, sometimes called “dân siêu lướt sóng” (ultra short-term surfers)​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. For example, a trader with ₫10 billion capital might borrow ₫90 billion from an internal kho (90% leverage) to rapidly trade volatile stocks – a 1–2 tick uptick on a large position yields huge profit​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Brokers tolerate this because the kho can charge high interest and also generate extra commissions from the hyper trading turnover​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.
  • Third-Party (External) Warehouses: In many cases, the broker essentially refers the client to an external financier or entity (which could be an affiliate or even an individual) who provides the funds or shares under a private agreement. This is what brokers often call “kho ngoài” (outside warehouse). The client still works via the brokerage’s platform, but part of their buying power is coming from this third party. A telltale sign is that for moderate leverage (e.g. 3:7 ratio), the extra buying power is shown openly in the client’s account (since it’s within semi-allowed bounds), but for ultra-high leverage (e.g. 2:8 or 1:9) the orders and shares might not even reflect in the client’s account – instead, the broker’s agent will execute those trades on behalf of the client in a separate account​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. One 2021 investigation found a broker advertising **3:7 margin openly (30% equity, 70% loan) on ~300 stocks, plus “kho margin cao” of 2:8 on all stocks via a separate app​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. When investors asked if such 80% loans were illegal, the broker’s agent admitted it was done through “đánh kho ngoài, (under) a personal name – you just deposit collateral, it’s not company margin”​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. In other words, the trade is carried out through an individual’s account (the warehouse provider), skirting the brokerage’s official margin ledger. Major firms typically reserve any explicit mention of kho for one-on-one discussions, but smaller firms and online channels have openly promoted these high-leverage services to attract clients​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.

Examples of Usage: By 2023, kho chứng khoán services had become “very vibrant, meeting the leverage needs of many investors” across the market​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. While exact data is unavailable (it’s an unofficial market), anecdotal evidence suggests many brokerages facilitated such loans during bull runs. In 2021, as stock prices surged, even ordinary investors were enticed by promises of higher margin – one investor noted seeing multiple offers of vay kho on social media groups and considered it when the market was hot​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Securities firms like VPS and others rose rapidly in market share during 2020–2021, amid rumors that they offered far more generous leverage than competitors, effectively leveraging warehouse-style funding to let clients buy more. In fact, the State Securities Commission fined VPS in 2022 for allowing clients to exceed margin limits (a relatively small fine of 125 million VND for letting a customer trade beyond their account’s buying power)​

funan.com.vn​

funan.com.vn – an indication that such practices were occurring. Even prestigious firms such as SSI or HSC reportedly had select high-net-worth clients using structured loans to increase their margin, though these were often through formal channels like bank loans (tripartite agreements) rather than the off-book đánh kho arrangements​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Mirae Asset Securities, backed by a large Korean financial group, became one of the largest margin lenders in Vietnam by using its ample capital to lend aggressively (its margin book exceeded 2.0 times its equity at one point)​

vneconomy.vn – largely within legal bounds, but it underscores the industry’s drive to extend as much credit as possible. Where those bounds end, the informal warehouse steps in. Brokers without big balance sheets, such as some newer firms (e.g. DSC, Pinetree, Everest, etc.), turned to kho services as a competitive edge: Everest Securities, for instance, advertised itself as “the largest stock warehouse service in Hanoi,” offering a stable 2:8 margin for all stocks and even intraday short-selling using available shares​

f319.com. This illustrates how kho chứng khoán has been utilized as a tool for both brokerage business growth and investor speculation.

Risks and Controversies of the Kho System

While kho chứng khoán can amplify profits in a rising market, it carries significant risks, regulatory issues, and ethical concerns:

  • Ultra-High Leverage & Market Risk: By allowing margin levels of 70-90%, kho arrangements leave investors extremely vulnerable to market swings. A single bad day can wipe out an account (“cháy tài khoản” – literally burn the account – as Vietnamese traders say). At 80% leverage, a stock dropping to its daily floor (e.g. -7%) triggers immediate margin calls for more collateral; if not met by the next day (or if the stock doesn’t rebound), the kho operator will forcibly liquidate the position​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. In late 2023, for example, highly leveraged kho positions contributed to a cascade of selling – traders noted that many stocks which had been pushed with 1:10 margin offers hit floor price on 17/10/2023, as even a slight dip caused mass forced-sales​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. This kind of volatility and feedback loop (margin calls causing more selling) is a major market stability concern. It was seen in the October 2022 crash as well, where cross-margin calls from both official brokers and kho providers fueled a sharp collapse​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Experienced investors caution that while profits on the way up are straightforward, the losses on the way down can be limitless when using 3:7 or 2:8 leverage – some even resorted to loan sharks to cover margin calls, compounding their troubles​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. A notorious case in 2014–2015 involved an investor who had shorted stock via a kho; when the stock price plummeted and liquidity dried up, he had to borrow at 1% daily interest from black-market lenders to repay the warehouse, ultimately defaulting on ₫25 billion (over $1 million)​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. These cautionary tales highlight the debt spiral risk and the possibility of devastating losses.
  • High Costs (Interest and Fees): The leverage from kho comes at a steep price. Interest rates on vay kho are typically “many times higher” than normal margin loans​dnse.com.vn​dnse.com.vn. While standard margin might be ~12–14% annual interest, kho deals often charge much more (the exact rate is privately negotiated​dnse.com.vn). Rates of 20–30% per annum (or even higher for short-term stock borrow fees) have been reported in some cases, especially when demand is high. Moreover, some kho providers tack on extra transaction fees, since trades may be executed through their accounts​dnse.com.vn. Investors effectively pay commissions twice – once to the broker handling the account and once to the kho operator – eating into returns. All these costs mean the breakeven point for profits is much higher, and if trades go wrong, debt can snowball quickly with interest-on-interest​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.
  • Portfolio Quality and Concentration Risk: Unlike official margin, which is limited to approved securities meeting certain financial health criteria, kho services impose no such quality filter​dnse.com.vn​dnse.com.vn. In fact, to get extreme leverage (e.g. 5:95 or 10:90), investors often must trade the riskiest stocks – those under special warning or trading restrictions​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. This is because blue-chip or stable stocks typically won’t be offered at absurd leverage ratios (the upside for the speculator is smaller and brokers/banks are less willing to take on that risk). Instead, kho funds flow into highly speculative shares – often small-cap companies with losses or regulatory flags​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. This means kho users tend to hold extremely volatile portfolios. If any such stock gets suspended or crashes, the investor can be left with illiquid collateral. The DNSE knowledge center bluntly notes that in a kho portfolio “there are even stocks under trading restriction or warning… if one cannot sell in time, they could lose everything”​dnse.com.vn. Thus, kho trading can amplify not just leverage, but also the underlying asset risk.
  • Custody and Rehypothecation Risks: Perhaps the greatest concern is the loss of custody and control inherent in đánh kho. Because the trades (and often the collateral) are handled in the kho provider’s account, the investor is exposed to the intermediary’s honesty and stability. The kho operator can, as one source puts it, “lock up all the deposit and even profits” if they choose, precisely because legally they own the trading account​dnse.com.vn. Investors have reported losing the ability to independently buy or sell their stocks – they must request the kho broker to do it, who may delay or refuse if it conflicts with their risk exposure​dnse.com.vn. Moreover, kho operations often involve rehypothecation of assets: if an investor pledges shares or cash to the kho, that collateral can be reused. For instance, an investor’s shares might be lent out to another client to short (as in the example where Investor A lent 5,000 VNM shares to the warehouse and Investor B borrowed those shares to sell short)​dnse.com.vn​dnse.com.vn. Likewise, cash deposits could be pooled and lent to others. This reuse of assets happens without the transparency and investor protections that a formal custodian or clearing system would provide. There is a legal custody risk: if the kho provider goes bankrupt, runs off, or is penalized by authorities, the investor might not easily reclaim their assets since everything was intermingled in someone else’s name. Reports indicate kho accounting is often done manually via Excel sheets sent to clients​dnse.com.vn, increasing the chance of errors or fraud. In short, kho clients must trust the provider to honor the agreement, a risky proposition when things go south.
  • Regulatory and Legal Issues: By design, kho chứng khoán flouts the regulations. It violates the SSC’s margin cap rule (initial margin < 50% equity) — e.g. providing 20% margin (80% loan) “is against the law”​dnse.com.vn — and also enables short selling which, while defined in the Securities Law, has no enacted framework yet (essentially making it illegal in practice)​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. If authorities discover a broker facilitating kho deals, the broker faces severe penalties, including heavy fines or even license suspension. The law is clear that offering margin beyond permitted levels through any subterfuge is a punishable offense​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. In one interview, a regulator noted that đánh kho is an “inevitable phenomenon in a hot market” but stressed that the State Securities Commission needs to ramp up inspections and supervision to enforce compliance​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. There have been enforcement actions: e.g. the SSC fined multiple firms for related violations (as noted, VPS was fined for margin infractions​funan.com.vn). However, these fines have often been relatively small in monetary terms – possibly seen as just a cost of doing business by some firms. There’s a regulatory catch-22 in play: the very demand for kho services indicates that investors want more leverage than the law allows. In response, industry groups have proposed raising the legal margin limit to reduce the incentive to go underground. In 2021, the Vietnam Financial Consultancy Association (VFCA) even suggested increasing the margin cap from 50% to 70% to “make the market more vibrant and free up broker capital”​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. While some economists agreed this could be phased in eventually​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn, others worry that less experienced investors could readily overextend and face ruin. Until any such change, the kho remains a grey area workaround – one that regulators publicly discourage but tacitly acknowledge as existing. This ambiguity creates a reputational and ethical gray zone: major reputable firms must balance competitiveness with the risk of breaking the rules, and investors must weigh the lure of quick gains against the danger of unenforceable contracts.

Comparisons to International Practices

The kho chứng khoán phenomenon in Vietnam parallels certain international concepts of margin financing and securities lending, but with crucial differences in regulation and transparency:

  • Margin Lending: Globally, margin trading is a well-established practice – for example, U.S. Regulation T allows investors to borrow up to 50% of a stock’s purchase price, and some brokers offer portfolio margining that can increase leverage for low-risk positions. However, these are formal, highly regulated services provided directly by the broker or banks. In Vietnam, the official margin regime (also 50% max loan) is comparable​dnse.com.vn​dnse.com.vn, but the kho emerges as a shadow margin system to circumvent those limits. In effect, it resembles the “shadow financing” seen in other emerging markets – for instance, the gray-market margin loans in China (through trust companies and peer-to-peer arrangements) that fueled the 2015 stock bubble. Similar to those, Vietnam’s kho lending operates outside official oversight, leading to hidden leverage in the market. Internationally, margin loans are recorded on balance sheets and subject to risk controls (like value-at-risk calculations in portfolio margin accounts). By contrast, kho loans are informal and can evade consolidated risk monitoring – meaning systemic leverage might be higher than regulators estimate, raising systemic risk.
  • Securities Lending and Short Selling: In developed markets, short selling is facilitated by a robust securities lending market: brokers or custodians borrow shares (often from institutional investors’ portfolios or mutual funds) to deliver to buyers when a client shorts a stock. The borrower pays a fee, and the lenders are protected by collateral and legal agreements. What Vietnam’s kho provides with “vay hàng” (borrowing stock to sell)​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn is functionally a securities lending service, but entirely off-exchange. The DNSE example of Investor A lending shares to the warehouse and Investor B borrowing them to short is essentially describing a rehypothecation and lending chain​dnse.com.vn​dnse.com.vn. Internationally, such a transaction would be handled by a prime broker under strict contract – the short-seller B would post cash collateral, A’s shares would be held in escrow, and each party’s rights are clear. In the kho scenario, all parties (A, B, and the warehouse operator) rely on trust and a simple private contract. There is no centralized clearinghouse guarantee. Moreover, short selling in Vietnam’s official market is (as of the time of research) not yet legalized, so kho is the only way to mimic it – a stark difference from markets like the US, where shorting and stock lending are integral, regulated activities. Thus, kho acts as an underground substitute for a securities lending desk or a prime brokerage.
  • Collateral and Custody Practices: International brokers that provide margin loans will typically hold the client’s securities as collateral in the client’s account, often in street name but clearly recorded as the client’s assets. They may have the right to rehypothecate (re-pledge) those securities to a bank for funding or lend them to others, but this is disclosed and subject to capital rules. Client account statements and regulatory audits ensure a level of transparency about who owes what. In Vietnam’s kho practice, the collateral (cash or stocks) often leaves the client’s account entirely and goes into an operator’s pool. That is a much higher custody risk than normally accepted globally. Essentially, kho providers act like unregulated mini prime-brokers or clearinghouses, but without segregation of client assets. This lack of independent custodianship is contrary to modern global standards where even in the event of a broker’s failure, client assets are supposed to be segregated/protected. The kho arrangement is personalistic – it relies on the provider’s solvency and integrity, much like old-style bucket shops or informal financing clubs.

In summary, the idea of a “stock warehouse” has analogues in the inventory that brokers maintain for market making or lending – for instance, a brokerage may keep an inventory of shares to lend for short sales or to provide liquidity. But internationally these inventories are transparently managed and regulated. Vietnam’s kho is an improvised, opaque version created due to regulatory constraints and high demand for leverage. It shows the ingenuity of the market in finding a way to get around rules, but it also highlights why such services are normally tightly controlled – to protect investors and the financial system. Policymakers in Vietnam have recognized this, which is why discussions about raising margin limits or formalizing stock borrowing are ongoing​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn. Until the formal framework catches up, kho chứng khoán remains a risky shadow parallel to official practices.

Implications for a “Kho feature” Concept on the Platform

Understanding kho chứng khoán is highly relevant if one aims to design a “Kho feature in a trading platform. Such a feature sounds like a formalized, platform-managed pool of assets (cash or stock) to facilitate advanced trading capabilities (early execution, group buys, extended margin) that would otherwise resemble what kho services offer informally.

Potential Benefits to Emulate: The kho concept demonstrates a clear market demand for flexibility:

  • Leverage and Margin Extension: A secondary warehouse could provide additional buying power to users beyond their cash, enabling margin trading in a controlled way. Unlike the opaque kho, the platform could make this an official service with transparent terms. For example, it could function as a pooled margin fund that users contribute to or borrow from, with the platform acting as the intermediary. By doing so within the platform’s architecture (and presumably within legal limits or under proper disclosure), one could capture the high interest in leverage while managing risk centrally.
  • Inventory for Short Selling or Quick Settlement: The warehouse could hold a reserve of popular stocks that can be lent to users who want to short sell or who want to settle trades faster. This is analogous to how kho allows intraday shorting by letting clients use “available shares” in the warehouse​f319.com. On a regulated platform, the secondary warehouse could fill the gap by temporarily delivering shares to buyers (or taking shares from sellers) to accommodate T+0 or T+1 instant settlement, with the actual trade settling T+2 in the back end. Essentially, it can act as a buffer inventory to enable features like immediate re-trading of proceeds or intraday short selling in a legal manner. Traditional brokers do this on a small scale with services like “advance on sale proceeds” (ứng trước tiền bán) – a warehouse concept could extend it further, providing instantaneous liquidity for active traders.
  • Group Buying and Aggregation: A platform-based warehouse could aggregate multiple small orders either to meet lot size requirements or to negotiate better prices. For instance, if many users want to buy fractional amounts of a high-priced stock, the warehouse can pool their funds, execute a bulk purchase, and then distribute the shares internally to those users. This is somewhat akin to kho pooling resources, but done for collective efficiency rather than individual margin. By holding the inventory in the warehouse ledger, the platform could later allocate or settle to individual accounts as needed. Early trade execution is facilitated because the platform’s warehouse might pre-fill an order from its inventory before the market trade actually completes.

Design and Risk Considerations: If implementing a Secondary Warehouse, the lessons from Vietnam’s kho highlight several important considerations:

  • Regulation & Transparency: Unlike the clandestine nature of current kho, the platform’s warehouse must be operated transparently and in compliance with regulations. This might involve obtaining the appropriate licenses (for margin lending or stock borrowing) or partnering with licensed entities (e.g. banks or brokers) for funding. Clear disclosure to users is key – they should know if their assets are moved to a pooled account or if they are effectively borrowing from a pool. The platform would need robust record-keeping so that every user’s stake is accounted for (to avoid the “Excel sheet” problem noted in informal kho​dnse.com.vn).
  • Custody and Security: To avoid the custody risk of đánh kho, the Secondary Warehouse should ideally be a segregated, audited account (or set of accounts) where user contributions and liabilities are tracked. Perhaps the platform itself or a custodian holds the warehouse assets in trust for users. Even if the platform temporarily holds users’ stocks in an omnibus manner (for example, to lend out to others), it should do so with smart contracts or legal agreements ensuring the user can retrieve their holdings or equivalent value. Implementing something like a blockchain-based ledger or at least an internal ledger for the warehouse could increase trust – every movement in and out of the warehouse is logged and perhaps visible to the user.
  • Risk Management: The platform must set prudent limits akin to a risk officer in a brokerage. While kho operators sometimes took extreme risks for profit, a well-designed warehouse should avoid becoming a source of unchecked leverage. This means setting a maximum leverage ratio for participants, real-time monitoring of positions, and automatic margin call and liquidation processes to contain losses. Essentially, it can offer margin but with proper margin calls and cutoff rules coded in (learning from the 2022 incidents, where cross margin calls wreaked havoc when not handled in time​tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn). If the Secondary Warehouse is extending credit, it also needs a capital base or insurance to absorb losses if many users default. The platform might allocate a reserve fund or require over-collateralization (unlike kho which often was under-collateralized in pursuit of 10x leverage).
  • Ethical Use and User Education: Finally, the platform should incorporate the hard lessons of kho: high leverage can attract “fast money” but also lead to fast collapse. Ensuring users understand the risks (perhaps through built-in warnings or requiring acknowledgment before using high leverage) will be important. The warehouse feature could be marketed as a convenience and liquidity tool – not just a get-rich-quick leverage booster. By prioritizing somewhat lower but safer leverage (maybe up to 2:1 or 3:1 on certain assets, or dynamic based on volatility), the platform can provide utility similar to kho but without encouraging reckless 10:1 bets. In essence, the Secondary Warehouse should strive to combine the purpose of the Vietnamese “kho” (flexible funding and inventory for traders) with the robustness of international best practices in margin lending and securities lending.

In conclusion, kho chứng khoán in Vietnam has been a creative if controversial solution to market demands, offering margin and stock loans outside official channels. It underscores the appetite for leverage and advanced trading strategies among Vietnamese investors, as well as the gaps in the current market infrastructure. By studying its mechanics – the good and the bad – the trading platform’s designers can implement a “Kho Feature ” that provides the benefits of a pooled asset base (leverage, liquidity, fast execution) while mitigating the risks through transparency, proper controls, and compliance. In doing so, the platform could legitimize and improve upon what has until now existed in the shadows of Vietnam’s stock market​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn​

tinnhanhchungkhoan.vn.

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